The Way Ahead for Sweden’s Partnership with NATO

Gen. Sverker Göranson, Supreme Commander of the Swedish Armed Forces gave MILITARY TECHNOLOGY an exclusive statement, featured in MT #9/2015.

Since its launch in 1994, Sweden’s partnership with NATO has been a remarkable success story. Like any strong relationship, it has flourished because it has been able to develop and adapt to new circumstances. For many years, its centre of gravity was NATO-led crisis management operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan. Now we are at the beginning of a new phase – a phase defined by the return of geopolitics and a deteriorating strategic situation in and around the Baltic Sea, basically as a result of Russia’s political and military behaviour.  

All indications are that this harsher Baltic climate will be with us for the foreseeable future. This fact has profound consequences for Sweden and for our partnership with NATO (as indeed for NATO itself). Its policy framework remains that of a partnership, but its practical content will have to shift – from the plains of Northern Afghanistan to the more familiar surroundings of the Baltic Sea and its coastal nations; from far-away crisis management operations to exercises and training on the ground, in the air and on the sea close to home.

In fact, this transition is already well underway. As it should be in our mutual interest to do so, I have full confidence that we will succeed in deepening our cooperation even further. The Enhanced Opportunities Programme (EOP), which is based on the principle of taking the individual partner’s capacities and needs as the point of departure, provides the flexible platform we need. Encouraging first steps in the application of EOP have been dialogue and exchange of assessments regarding the situation in the Baltic Sea area.  

For the Swedish Armed Forces, we are pressing ahead with a comprehensive reform effort – a process launched back in 2009, but one which has assumed added urgency in light of recent developments. It aims at creating a robust, agile and mobile force which can respond effectively to security challenges at home, in the Baltic area and beyond.

Swedish Air Force Saab GRIPEN C with Diehl Defense IRIS-T and Rafael LITENING Pod on Gotland. (Photo: Mönch/DPM)

In June the Swedish Parliament, with a broad majority, adopted a defence resolution for the period 2016-2020. The bill, which is based on a strong regional focus, increases the defence budget with some 10% by 2020 in order to boost the Armed Forces’ operational capability in the coming years. Investments will be made in updating personal equipment for our soldiers, communication equipment and weapon systems. On the Army side, tanks will be upgraded and new mortars acquired; the navy will receive two next-generation submarines; continued investments will be made for air defence, including the introduction of the next generation of JAS GRIPEN fighters and new short and medium range surface-to-air missiles. Training and exercises will be other strong priorities. After many years of diminished funding, this marks a crucial step in the process of lifting our capacity – across all three services - to an adequate level. Another important dimension of the bill is the tasking given to relevant government agencies to resume planning for civilian defence and civilian support to military defence. This was an integral part of the comprehensive defence concept applied during the Cold War, but was subsequently abandoned during the 1990s. Its resumption is most welcome, not least given the emergence of hybrid threats which will require close coordination between military and civilian actors.  
 

VISBY-class HSwMS NYKÖPING (K34). (Photo: Mönch/DPM)

The work to strengthen Swedish defence follows a two-pronged approach. Apart from the national process, we must work intensively with like-minded neighbours and partners. Fortunately, there is a rich variety of cooperative formats to draw on. These include key bilateral relationships with Finland and other Nordic and Baltic countries, as well as other individual Allies, including the US. Based on a broadly shared assessment of the increased threats facing us in the Baltic region, and a Swedish willingness to shoulder its part of transatlantic solidarity, such cooperation is now being stepped up.
However, our cooperation with NATO is simply indispensable as it provides a unique structure and menu for our interoperability efforts. As the saying goes, if it did not exist, we would have to invent it. Tested tools like PARP and OCC will continue to serve their purpose and our participation in NRF will remain a key component of our cooperation. Access to the most complex and demanding NATO exercises, particularly the ones conducted in the Baltic area, has long been a major Swedish priority. If anything, it will only become more important in the future. Ideally, such participation should allow for early Swedish involvement in the planning phase, giving us the opportunity to contribute to the shaping of the exercise. The core of the Swedish security policy doctrine is the recognition that security today is best built in cooperation. The practical implication is that we must have the ability to provide and receive military support. Our exercise profile must reflect this political ambition.
Looking ahead, the context for Sweden’s partnership with NATO will be very different from what we grew accustomed to during the “ISAF years”. Its relevance, however, will likely be as strong as ever. Shared values are a strong bond, as is mutually beneficial practical cooperation.